By Scott Sehon
Will we have loose will and ethical accountability? Is loose will appropriate with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we will be able to make growth on those questions through concentrating on an underlying factor: the character of motion clarification. while anyone acts, or does anything on function, we clarify the habit via bringing up the agent's purposes. The dominant view in philosophy of brain has been to construe such motives as a species of causal clarification. half I of the publication proposes and defends a non-causal account of motion and employer, in response to which cause clarification of human habit is irreducibly teleological instead of causal. half II applies the teleological account of motion to unfastened will and accountability, arguing that the loose actions--the ones for which we're at once responsible--are the goal-directed activities, the activities which are teleologically explicable when it comes to our purposes. it really is then argued that this non-causal account of motion undermines the charm of incompatibilist arguments, arguments trying to exhibit that loose will isn't appropriate with determinism. past this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works good in perform: it's in accord with our transparent intuitions approximately situations, and it either explains and offers information within the instances the place our intuitions are murkier.
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Additional info for Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account
However, to reiterate, when the respondent doesn’t see even any prima facie value to having done B, she won’t give any of these sorts of answers, but will instead find the question baffling. The question of why someone did not do B seems to be, in typical cases, shorthand for something like: “It seems to me that in those circumstances it would have been reasonable to do B in order to achieve G; you didn’t do this; why? ” I suggest that even in the absence of such a skeptical questioner, when we explain omissions we are in the same game.
Or put in Pereboom’s terms, would such pure sadness “be an effective way to motivate avoidance of future misbehavior”? In Pereboom’s world in which everyone knows that there is no free will, my son is still a smart boy, and recognizes that he is not blameworthy for having driven drunk, that he has nothing more than causal responsibility for the pedestrian’s injury, and that my sadness about his character and dispositions is of the same sort that I would feel about him if he had been diagnosed with a terrible disease.
Whether this combination of thoughts is coherent is very closely related to Dana Nelkin’s claim that “Rational deliberators, in 18 What’s at Stake in the Free Will Debate? virtue of their very nature as rational deliberators, must represent themselves as free” (2011, p. ) I do not want to claim any of this as a decisive objection to Pereboom’s view. Maybe I can limit myself to feeling and expressing the specific type of sadness and disappointment that Pereboom’s account allows, and maybe such sadness will still have some motivating effects, even if it does amount to treating my son as an object of policy.